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You never change things by fighting the existing reality. To 
change something, build a new model that makes the 
existing model obsolete.  
Buckminster Fuller1
                                                     
 * Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. Special thanks to Alena 
Eckhardt and Michael T. Roberts for their thoughtful comments, to Cheryl Gaines 
and Rebeca Wise for sharing their experiences as small-scale producers, and to 
UCLA Law librarians Scott Dewey and Vicki Steiner for their invaluable research 
assistance. I am grateful to Professor Bruce Ching and the Michigan State Law 
Review for the opportunity to participate in the symposium Persuasion in Civil 
Rights Advocacy. Inclusion of advocacy for animals within civil rights advocacy 
appropriately reflects society’s increasing awareness of animals as individuals and 
their social justice claims, yet that awareness has been slow to arrive on the legal 
academic scene.  
1. As quoted in DANIEL QUINN, BEYOND CIVILIZATION: HUMANITY’S NEXT 
GREAT ADVENTURE 137 (1999). 
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INTRODUCTION
Two objectives have been prominent in animal law advocacy: 
reduction of human-inflicted suffering and recognition of legal 
personhood for animals. These have meant quite different things to 
different advocates, but each contains the perspective that animals 
are worthy of individual, not just group or species-based, protection. 
Another commonality is that all legal advocates encounter the 
challenge that animals are legally classified as the property of 
humans. This means that animals are not yet legally recognized 
persons; they are currently “resources” legally owned and controlled 
by human legal persons.2 While animals could, theoretically, be 
protected despite their property status, the primary statutes enacted to 
protect them (anticruelty statutes) only promise, but do not deliver, 
protection from the infliction of severe suffering.3 In a capitalistic 
society in which owners of resources are generally encouraged to 
fully exploit their property as those owners think best, regulations 
that limit owner prerogative must be justified, and legal contests 
between legal objects (animals) and their owners (humans) will not 
often turn out well for animals.4
This Article is about representation of vegan businesses as an 
underutilized but important pathway for animal law. It avoids 
contests between property animals and their owners and reduces 
argumentation about whether particular acts of inflicted suffering are 
                                                     
2. Professor Gary Francione has written extensively about the nature and 
consequences of animals’ legal status as the property of humans. See, e.g., GARY L.
FRANCIONE, ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 32 (1995). 
3. See, e.g., id. at 32 (noting that while anticruelty statutes prohibit 
“unnecessary suffering, . . . suffering that results in a more efficient production of 
animal products is tolerated”); David J. Wolfson & Mariann Sullivan, Foxes in the 
Hen House: Animals, Agribusiness, and the Law: A Modern American Fable, in
ANIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS 206 (Cass R. Sunstein & 
Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2004) (describing how the agriculture “industry alone 
defines the criminality of its own conduct”); Darian M. Ibrahim, The Anticruelty 
Statute: A Study in Animal Welfare, 1 J. ANIMAL L. & ETHICS 175, 203 (2006) 
(arguing that “anticruelty statutes, while noble in theory, are ineffective in practice 
precisely because they do not challenge the underlying exploitation of animals”). 
4. At best, anticruelty statutes protect against individual acts of purely 
gratuitous cruelty inflicted on individual animals. Exemptions for all 
institutionalized forms of inflicted suffering—agricultural uses; research; 
entertainment such as circuses, zoos, rodeos, television, and film; pest control—
reduce the scope of anticruelty statutes to the point that little remains. Certainly they 
do not serve to protect the billions of animals used for “necessary” purposes. See 
generally the various sources cited in supra note 3. 
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justified or whether animals are or are not worthy of better treatment 
when such better treatment diminishes human entitlement. I argue 
that providing good alternatives to consuming or using animals 
facilitates improved animal welfare laws or even abolition of animal 
use altogether because such replacement consumption loosens 
consumers’ perceived need to consume animal-derived products, 
which, in turn, increases receptivity to legal reform for the benefit of 
animals. 
For purposes of this Article, “vegan business” is defined as any 
for-profit enterprise with the potential to reduce or eliminate the use 
of animals altogether, whether or not that is the objective of the 
entrepreneur and whether or not animals are the exclusive 
beneficiaries of the business’s success.5 Imagine a world without 
zoos and yet rich with opportunities for people to learn about and 
“experience” animals. Virtually real presentations of drone and 
“selfie” footage of animals in the wild could eventually lead to a 
world of greater appreciation for animals, more vibrant 
“experiences” with them, and a greater sense of urgency to protect 
wild animals and their habitats.6 Imagine a world without time-
                                                     
5. Under this definition, a business that produces equipment for 
determining whether an egg will hatch as a male or female chick is not a “vegan 
business,” even though such equipment could eliminate the suffering of male chicks, 
who are killed in any number of ways because they serve no purpose in the egg 
industry. Germany Says ‘No More Chick Shredding,’ ANIMALS AUSTL.,
http://www.animalsaustralia.org/features/germany-stops-shredding-chicks.php (last 
updated Oct. 21, 2015). Although such equipment would allow egg producers to 
destroy embryonic male chicks before they develop nervous systems, use of the 
equipment would be in furtherance of egg production, which involves severe 
suffering far beyond that experienced by unwanted male chicks and does not 
eliminate the use of animals. By contrast, a “vegan business” would replace the use 
of animal products altogether. The Vegg, a completely plant-based substitution for 
eggs, is produced by a “vegan business.” THE VEGG, https://thevegg.com (last visited 
Nov. 9, 2015). 
6. Regarding the use of drones to capture intimate footage of wild animals, 
see, for example, Camera Drones Capture Africa’s Wild Side, SMITHSONIAN.COM,
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/videos/category/smithsonian-channel/camera-
drones-capture-africas-wild-side/?no-ist (last visited Nov. 9, 2015); Russell 
McLendon, Drone Films Amazing Aerial Video of Dolphins, Whales, MOTHER 
NATURE NETWORK (Mar. 5, 2014, 9:42 AM), http://www.mnn.com/earth-
matters/animals/blogs/drone-films-amazing-aerial-video-of-dolphins-whales; Sarah 
Gordon, Is This the Future of Safaris? Drones Get Up-Close to Capture Spectacular 
Footage of Curious Giraffes and a Family of Rhino, DAILYMAIL.COM (May 9, 2014,
4:20 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/travel/article-2624119/The-future-safaris-
Drones-close-Kenyan-wildlife.html#ixzz3e69pzFGA; and Barcroft TV, Homemade 
Safari: Incredible Drone Footage of Serengeti Wildlife, YOUTUBE (Jan. 7, 2014), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q6iXT4-Oc2Q. 
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  Regarding the use of “camera traps” and other techniques to capture 
still photos and, sometimes, motion-picture footage of animals in the wild, see, for 
example, Krithi K. Karanth & Arjun Srivathsa, India’s Top Wild-Animal Selfies,
NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (July 7, 2014), http://voices.nationalgeographic.com/2014/07/ 
07/indias-top-wild-animal-selfies/; Lukas Pilz & Josh Sampiero, Getting Close with 
Wild Beasts (and Cute Meerkats), RED BULL (Mar. 30, 2015), http://www. 
redbull.com/us/en/adventure/stories/1331714278919/wild-animal-close-up-photos;
Natalie Crofts, 20 Wild ‘Selfies’ of Animals in the Serengeti, KSL (June 9, 2015,
11:55 AM), http://www.ksl.com/?nid=1012&sid=35001670; Laura Poppick, Photos: 
Best Wild Animal Selfies, LIVE SCI. (Dec. 11, 2013, 10:00 AM), 
http://www.livescience.com/41749-best-wild-animal-selfies.html. 
  For examples of the growing use of virtual reality technology for 
enjoyment of and education about wild animals and their habitats, see Jeffrey 
Bedrick, 3D Virtual Reality Rainforest, NAT’L WILDLIFE HUMANE SOC’Y, 
http://www.humanewildlife.org/rainforest.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2015); Cardigan 
Bay Sea Quest, THE WILDLIFE TRUST OF SOUTH & WEST WALES, http://www. 
welshwildlife.org/visitor-centres/cardigan-bay-marine-wildlife-centre/cardigan-bay-
sea-quest/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2015); Oman WildLife Virtual Reality Application, 
OMAN INFO. TECH. AUTHORITY (July 22, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=dOKTchI3Ujk; Stephen Babcock, This Edtech Startup Is Bringing Virtual 
Reality to the Classroom, TECHNICAL.LY BALT. (May 29, 2015, 8:23 AM), 
http://technical.ly/baltimore/2015/05/29/alchemy-learning-virtual-reality-classroom-
oculus/; Dorling Kindersley Multimedia (DK) Eyewitness Virtual Reality Bird 
Animals & Wildlife for Windows for 10 and Up, AMAZON.COM, http://www. 
amazon.com/Kindersley-Multimedia-DK-Eyewitness-Wildlife/dp/B0047PEGXG
(last visited Nov. 9, 2015). Some of these programs, such as Alchemy Learning’s
project in Baltimore and the Wildlife Trust of South and West Wales’ Marine 
Wildlife Sea Quest, explicitly use the Oculus Rift virtual reality technology and 
goggles developed for advanced video gaming. See OCULUS, https://www. 
oculus.com/en-us/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2015). 
  Although there is ongoing debate about the appropriate use of, and 
limits on, drones and other photographic or monitoring devices with regard to 
wildlife and other issues, both drones and camera traps have become established 
tools used by wildlife conservationists both in government agencies and NGOs. See, 
e.g., Linda Qiu, Watch: Can Drones Help Save Wildlife Around the World?, NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC (Nov. 15, 2014), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/ 
11/141114-drones-wildlife-poaching-animals-conservation/; Nancy Averett, Drones 
Take Off as Wildlife Conservation Tool, AUDUBON (July-Aug. 2014), 
https://www.audubon.org/magazine/july-august-2014/drones-take-wildlife-
conservation-tool; Adam Vaughan, WWF Plans to Use Drones to Protect Wildlife, 
THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 7, 2013, 9:17 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/ 
2013/feb/07/wwf-wildlife-drones-illegal-trade; Josh Lew, The Ethics of Drones in 
the Wild, MOTHER NATURE NETWORK (Jan. 21, 2015, 2:04 PM), 
http://www.mnn.com/green-tech/gadgets-electronics/stories/the-ethics-of-drones-in-
the-wild; Karanth & Srivathsa, supra. Hunters, fishers, and illegal poachers also 
have sought to take advantage of drones, however. See, e.g., Sigi De Vos, Poachers, 
Conservationists Use Drones and GPS in Wildlife Battle, NBC NEWS (Jan. 17, 2015, 
6:18 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/poachers-conservationists-use-
drones-gps-wildlife-battle-n287611; Michael R. Shea, The Drone Report: Do 
Unmanned Aerial Systems Have a Place in Hunting and Fishing?, FIELD & STREAM 
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consuming, inaccurate tests on animals and with safe, less expensive, 
faster means to determine chemical toxicity. Such alternative 
methods of toxicity testing are already available and more are in the 
pipeline.7 Imagine a world without the severe suffering that results 
when mother cows are separated from the calves they are forced to 
bear so that humans can take those cows’ milk,8 and that same world 
                                                                                                               
(Mar. 2014), http://www.fieldandstream.com/articles/hunting/2014/03/drone-report-
do-unmanned-aerial-systems-have-place-hunting-and-fishing.
7. See, e.g., NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMM. ON 
TOXICITY TESTING & ASSESSMENT OF ENVTL. AGENTS, TOXICITY TESTING IN THE 21ST
CENTURY: A VISION AND A STRATEGY—REPORT IN BRIEF (2007), http://dels.nas.edu/ 
resources/static-assets/materials-based-on-reports/reports-in-brief/Toxicity_Testing_ 
final.pdf (calling for toxicity testing that is “quicker, less expensive, and more 
directly relevant to human exposures” by moving away from animal testing that is 
frequently unreliable or ambiguous as well as “expensive and time consuming” and 
moving toward more sophisticated modern test methods based upon laboratory 
exposure of human cells and tissue samples, new rapid assay technologies developed 
by the pharmaceutical industry, and the computational tools and Big Data analysis 
approach of bioinformatics). For the full report, see NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., NAT’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMM. ON TOXICITY TESTING & ASSESSMENT OF ENVTL.
AGENTS, TOXICITY TESTING IN THE 21ST CENTURY: A VISION AND A STRATEGY
(2007); see also K. van Leeuwen et al., Using Chemical Categories to Fill Data 
Gaps in Hazard Assessment, 20 SAR & QSAR ENVTL. RES. 207 (2009) (calling for 
increased testing using a chemical categories approach based upon similar 
toxicological behavior of substances); G. Schaafsma et al., REACH, Non-Testing 
Approaches, and the Urgent Need for a Change in Mind Set, 53 REGULATORY 
TOXICOLOGY & PHARMACOLOGY 70 (2009); Valerie Y. Soldatow et al., In Vitro
Models for Liver Toxicity Testing, 2 TOXICOLOGY RES. 23, (2013); Shiranee Pereira 
& Massimo Tettamanti, Testing Times in Toxicology: In Vitro vs In Vivo Testing, 2 
ALTEX PROC. 53 (2013); In Vitro Predictive Toxicity Testing, HEMOGENIX,
http://www.hemogenix.com/app_InvitroTox.php (last visited Nov. 9, 2015) 
(showcasing a wide range of non-animal testing alternatives); Toxicology,
CYPROTEX, http://www.cyprotex.com/toxicology (last visited Nov. 9, 2015) 
(showcasing a wide range of non-animal testing alternatives); In Vitro Toxicity 
Testing: Technologies and Global Markets, BCC RES. (Jan. 2014), 
http://www.bccresearch.com/market-research/pharmaceuticals/in-vitro-toxicity-
phm017e.html (noting that “the global in vitro toxicity testing market was valued at 
$4 billion in 2011 and more than $4.9 billion in 2012”). Regarding a recently 
developed testing technique to improve accuracy while avoiding animal testing—
”organs on chips,” or computer chips designed to mimic the behavior of human 
organs—see, for example, James Mitchell Crow, The Man Who Built Organs on 
Chips, COSMOS (Jan. 19, 2015), https://cosmosmagazine.com/life-sciences/man-
who-built-organs-chips; Organs-on-Chips, WYSS INST., http://wyss.harvard.edu/ 
viewpage/461/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2015); and Three ‘Organs-on-Chips’ Ready to 
Serve as Disease Models, Drug Testbeds, WYSS INST., http://wyss.harvard.edu/ 
viewpage/484/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2015). 
8. Regarding suffering of dairy cows and calves from separation, see, for 
example, How Does Drinking Milk Harm Cows?, NZ DAIRY CRUELTY, 
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with flavorful nondairy cheese and milk products.9 Slowly that world 
is becoming reality. Ideas at the cusp of the transition to a kinder-to-
animals society deserve assistance from animals’ legal advocates.
Lawyers who identify themselves as “animal lawyers” have 
been slow to get involved in representation of vegan businesses. 
More reasons for this will be explored in Part III of this Article, but 
here it is useful to note that one reason for this has been that the few 
lawyers able and willing to dedicate time and resources to help 
animals have been more drawn to stopping institutional and 
individual behaviors that cause current suffering to existing animals 
than to assisting companies whose products will reduce or eliminate 
future suffering. Stopping farming practices such as intensive 
confinement10 has been seen as more compelling than assisting 
companies regarding legal hurdles to producing vegan products. An 
important related reason is that some animal lawyers do not identify 
with the idea of a vegan world in which animals are not used by 
humans. Along the lines of utilitarian philosopher Peter Singer’s 
                                                                                                               
http://www.nzdairy.org/thelifeofadairycow.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2015); Cows for 
Dairy: The Milk of Human Unkindness, WOODSTOCK FARM SANCTUARY,
http://woodstocksanctuary.org/learn-3/factory-farmed-animals/cows-for-dairy/ (last 
visited Nov. 9, 2015); and Sarah Taylor, Dairy Cows and Their Calves: When 
Mother Is Separated from Baby, VEGSOURCE (June 5, 2013), 
http://www.vegsource.com/sarah-taylor/dairy-cows-and-their-calves-when-mother-
is-separated-from-baby.html. 
9. There are numerous nondairy alternatives to milk, cheese, and other 
dairy products now available. See, e.g., Ashley Capps, Your Guide to Going Dairy 
Free: Plant-Based Milks, Cheeses, and More, FREE FROM HARM (Oct. 24, 2013), 
http://freefromharm.org/food-products/your-guide-to-going-dairy-free/; Carly 
Harrill, 5 Gourmet Vegan Cheeses for Any Occasion, NATURALLY SAVVY (May 10, 
2014), http://naturallysavvy.com/eat/5-gourmet-vegan-cheeses-for-any-occasion
(noting that “rising in-store sales are starting to beg the question: Is gourmet vegan 
cheese the next big food trend?”); DAIYA FOODS, HTTP://US.DAIYAFOODS.COM/ (LAST 
VISITED NOV. 9, 2015); Gwendolyn Mathers, Vegans Take Home Trophies at the 
10th Annual Grilled Cheese Invitational, COMPASSION OVER KILLING (Apr. 30, 
2012), http://cok.net/blog/2012/04/vegans-win-grilled-cheese-invitational/;
Gwendolyn Mathers, Award-Winning Aurora Borealis Dessert Grilled Cheese,
http://us.daiyafoods.com/recipes/award-winning-aurora-borealis-dessert-grilled-
cheese (last visited Nov. 9, 2015); Milk Free Chocolate - Dairy Free, Nut Free, 
Vegan Chocolate, PREMIUM CHOCOLATIERS, http://www.premiumchocolatiers.com/
(last visited Nov. 9, 2015). 
10. See, for example, the Proposition 2 campaign in California, which 
successfully changed confinement standards for certain intensively confined 
animals. California Proposition 2, Standards for Confining Farm Animals (2008),
BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_2,_Standards_for_ 
Confining_Farm_Animals_(2008) (last visited Nov. 9, 2015); CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 25990 (West 2012 & Supp. 2015) (codification of Proposition 2). 
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approach,11 they hold the view that using, killing, and consuming 
animals is morally acceptable as long as those animals have not 
suffered. Support of vegan businesses seems to be overkill from this 
perspective.  
I argue in this Article that support of vegan businesses makes it 
easier to secure change in both directions—reduction of human-
inflicted suffering and reduction in use. In support of that argument, I 
begin in Part I with a consideration and application of two long-
standing social psychological theories, cognitive dissonance and 
social conformity. These theories provide conceptual links between 
the degree of social normalization of the infliction of suffering on 
animals, human investment in seeing ourselves as morally good, 
human impulses to reduce dissonance between our behavior and 
moral beliefs, and blinding effects of social conformity.  
Part II presents three examples of legal advocacy that can 
predictably enhance survival of vulnerable12 vegan businesses (as I 
define the term above) and in which there is no record of animal 
advocacy of any kind. I begin with a product-labeling dispute 
between The Cultured Kitchen, an artisanal producer of cultured 
cashew cheese, and the California Department of Food and 
Agriculture. I next consider a California law that adversely impacted
small-scale artisanal food vendors, followed by consideration of laws 
in California and New York City that have limited the operation of 
food trucks. Philosophical and pragmatic reasons for lack of animal 
lawyer advocacy emerge in these examples and are explored more 
directly in Part III.  
I. SOCIAL CONFORMITY AND COGNITIVE DISSONANCE THEORIES
Many people might guess that our views about what is 
acceptable or necessary to eat are colored by social conformity to 
eating standards we grew up with and adopted as we’ve moved 
through life in different social settings. Yet, few recognize how 
                                                     
11. PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION: A NEW ETHICS FOR OUR 
TREATMENT OF ANIMALS (1975). 
12. In this context, a “vulnerable” vegan business is one that lacks sufficient 
resources to advance its legal interests. Some vegan businesses are so well-funded 
from the outset that they need little assistance with market access and navigating 
legal hurdles. An apparent example is Kite Hill, a vegan cheese manufacturer with a 
talented, resourceful, experienced founding team and a track record of remarkable 
success with innovation and market access. See, e.g., Our Story, KITE HILL,
http://www.kite-hill.com/about-us/our-story/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2015). 
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deeply social conformity runs. Similarly, many people might have 
learned already about cognitive dissonance as an explanation for our 
tendency to shift our beliefs about our actions, and the necessity of 
our actions, to align with a positive appraisal of ourselves. Yet here, 
too, it may be challenging to recognize the implications of this 
tendency. This Part considers research about these accepted social 
psychological theories and why support of vegan businesses holds 
promise for changing the cultural context in which people evaluate 
the need for legal reform.  
A. Social Conformity Theory 
Many people know about the notorious experiments conducted 
by Stanley Milgram to test obedience to authority. Those 
experiments involved participants apparently giving electric shocks 
to confederates of the researcher, in accordance with researcher 
direction and in disregard of the confederates’ expressions of pain.13
Milgram found sobering degrees of willingness to abdicate 
responsibility for one’s decisions, even to the extent of overriding 
basic humanity.14 However, even before that, in 1951, Solomon 
Asch, a professor at Swarthmore College, designed a study to 
observe the effects of the broader phenomenon of social 
conformity.15 His experiment required college students (“naïve 
participants”16) to perform a simple mental task of matching lines of 
the same length.17 The task was intentionally very simple and could 
have been performed easily and correctly if the naïve participants 
made their decision without input from others. Instead, each naïve 
participant took the test with others who, as confederates of the 
researcher, unanimously chose an incorrect answer on several 
                                                     
13. Stanley Milgram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67 J. ABNORMAL &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 371 (1963). 
14. Id. at 376-78. 
15. S.E. Asch, Effects of Group Pressure upon the Modification and 
Distortion of Judgments, in GROUPS, LEADERSHIP AND MEN 177 (Harold Guetzkow 
ed., 1951); see also SOLOMON E. ASCH, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 450-500 (1952); 
Solomon E. Asch, Studies of Independence and Conformity: I. A Minority of One 
Against a Unanimous Majority, 70 PSYCHOL. MONOGRAPHS 1 (1956). 
16. I use the term “naïve participants” to refer to participants in the 
experiment who were not privy to the nature of the experiment. Asch used the term 
“critical subject.” ASCH, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY supra note 15, at 454. 
17. Test subjects compared a line on one card with three lines on another 
card to determine which of the three lines matched the line on the card with only one 
line. Id. at 451-52. 
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occasions during the experiment.18 Asch reported that erroneous 
choices by the confederates altered the choice of the naïve 
participants in one-third of the trials.19
The test was very straightforward and easy for people not 
influenced by others expressing confidence in erroneous choices.20
Between 20% and 42% of naïve participants remained consistently 
independent of the group,21 although no participant completely 
disregarded the fact that his or her judgment differed from that of the 
group.22 Among those who chose the correct answer, some were 
completely confident,23 despite acknowledged difference; there were 
others who were uncertain to varying degrees but ultimately chose to 
go against the group.24
The situation with respect to those naïve participants who 
agreed with the group is particularly interesting for purposes of this 
Article. In the original experiment, only one person always yielded 
to the group’s decision, giving the reason that he actually perceived 
the situation as they did.25 That individual’s perceptual alteration was 
rare for its consistency throughout all trials, but perceptual alteration 
does not seem at all uncommon among naïve participants who 
agreed with the majority. Asch suggested, but could not prove at that 
time, that altered perception was occurring with some regularity:  
Others who yielded to the majority did so from time to time on a 
perceptual basis . . . . The contradiction of the majority produced at times 
what we may call “cognitive confusion.” When the discrepancies were 
moderate, some subjects became increasingly uncertain and “made” their 
estimates conform to the majority on a seemingly perceptual basis. That 
this probably occurred seems supported by the observation that many 
subjects, when subsequently confronted with a pair of cards and informed 
of the erroneous estimates they had [given] earlier, showed unfeigned 
astonishment.26
                                                     
18. Id. at 455.  
19. Id. at 457. 
20. Asch reports a low error rate among control group members. Id.  
21. Id. at 458. Twenty percent were consistently correct, but making a 
mistake would have been consistent with the control group, which had no wrong-
choice confederates. Id. If naïve participants who made only one error are included 
with the 20% who made no errors, the percentage of consistently independent 
participants rises to 42%. Id. 
22. Id. at 461. 
23. Id. at 465-66. 
24. Id. at 468. 
25. Id. at 469. 
26. Id. at 469-70. 
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In 2005, Gregory S. Berns and a group of researchers employed 
an experimental protocol, modeled after Asch’s original experiment, 
to test whether perception really is altered or if social conformity 
operates at the level of conscious choice.27 Using fMRI, the 
researchers hoped to identify brain activity sufficient to distinguish 
between participants who knowingly chose an incorrect answer and 
participants whose actual perception of the task was altered by 
knowledge of others’ choices such that those participants genuinely 
believed the answer they gave was correct when it was not.28 Again, 
the task, modeled after Asch’s experiment, was simple enough that 
all participants would very likely have made the correct choice if 
they were given no input from others.29 Unlike the Asch test, though, 
the Berns testing strategy involved telling participants as to some 
questions that a computer had generated the model (incorrect) 
answer and as to other questions that a group of humans had 
generated the model (incorrect) answer.30
The hypothesis, framed in terms of brain activity, was 
presented as follows: 
[I]f social conformity resulted from conscious decision making, this would 
be associated with functional changes in prefrontal cortex [which is 
activated during executive decision making and conscious choice among 
alternatives], whereas if social conformity was more perceptually based, 
then activity changes would be seen in occipital and parietal regions 
[associated with processing of visual information].31
Berns first found, as did Asch, that there was a statistically 
significant shift in the direction of incorrect answers when the 
participant thought s/he was participating in a group in which other 
participants unanimously chose a different (erroneous) answer. 
According to the data derived from the experiment, participants’ 
error rates increased to 41% when participants believed that a group 
of other participants had all selected the same (erroneous) choice.32
The research team next examined the question of how the 
participant was using her/his brain when s/he yielded or failed to 
                                                     
27. Gregory S. Berns et al., Neurobiological Correlates of Social 
Conformity and Independence During Mental Rotation, 58 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY
245 (2005). 
28. See id. at 245.  
29. Berns et al. used mental rotation of shapes instead of the line drawings 
used by Asch. Id.
30. Id. at 246. 
31. Id. at 245. 
32. Id. at 248. 
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yield to the group’s decision. They did this in two ways: fMRI 
analysis of brain activity while the subject was engaged in the task of 
making a choice and debriefing questionnaires.33 As to the fMRI 
results, the researchers detected increased brain activity only in those 
parts of the brain associated with processing visual information.34 As 
to the debriefing questionnaires, the researchers report that “[t]he 
vast majority of participants indicated that, at least on some trials, 
they went along with the external information because they thought 
that they had arrived serendipitously at the same correct answer.”35
What about the times when the participants made independent 
choices? Although sometimes people are impervious to outside 
influence because they are rock-solid as to their own decisions, other 
times people experience dissonance between their initial choice and 
that of the group but ultimately stick with their initial choice. The 
discomfort could stem from a lack of certainty or because holding a 
minority position is uncomfortable, even if the person knows his/her 
answer to be correct.36 The Berns research team examined the images 
of brain activity when participants were deciding differently than the 
group and found evidence that some participants experienced 
emotional strain when going against the grain.37 Interestingly, those 
participants’ brains registered emotional strain only when reaching a 
conclusion different from that of other humans and not when 
disagreeing with a computer-generated “correct” response.38
The use of fMRI is still relatively new, and results based on the 
early science of measuring and analyzing brain activity may well be 
replaced when measurement techniques improve. Nevertheless, if we 
take these early findings as indicative of an underlying propensity to 
conform even as to incorrect choices about matters we would 
analyze correctly if left to our own devices, then what of choices that 
are difficult to begin with? The foregoing suggests that if the society 
around us has normalized, say, inequality as to women or infliction 
of suffering on animals, scientific information that might have been 
effective to help us behave morally correctly—no matter how 
                                                     
33. Id. at 246-47.  
34. “[I]t was striking that the effects of social conformity were detected 
only in the most posterior aspects—the occipital and parietal lobes.” Id. at 251. 
35. Id. at 252.  
36. Matthew J. Hornsey et al., On Being Loud and Proud: Non-Conformity 
and Counter-Conformity to Group Norms, 42 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 319, 332 
(2003). 
37. Berns et al., supra note 27, at 252. 
38. Id.
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accurate and detailed—will have limited effect. An individual 
looking at an image of hens stacked floor to ceiling in small, 
intensely crowded cages might literally perceive the situation as 
benign if others around her tell her that the birds are not suffering, 
cannot suffer, or that their owners would never cause them to suffer 
because such suffering would diminish the birds’ productivity.39
Asch’s and Berns’s research suggests that it is too simple to assume 
that such a person is consciously choosing an external 
characterization or suppressing her idea to the contrary; s/he may not 
be consciously aware that there is another way of perceiving or 
understanding what s/he is seeing once it has been characterized a 
particular way by someone else.  
B. Cognitive Dissonance Theory 
If we add to the idea of social conformity the idea that people 
strive to reduce cognitive dissonance in the direction of maintaining 
a positive self-image,40 we have a prescription for the consumption of 
products derived from animals without psychological discomfort 
about the suffering those animals endured. For example, people who 
have enjoyed eggs all of their lives, perhaps including eggs prepared 
by their mothers, may link positive feelings about their mothers, the 
experience of eating eggs, and positive feelings about themselves 
such that they cannot easily consciously process or admit 
information about the suffering of the hens who produced those eggs. 
Even if the person himself does not enjoy eggs, the fact that a 
majority of others he considers kind are eating eggs creates conflict 
in the context of information that horrible suffering was inflicted on 
                                                     
39. See UNITED EGG PRODUCERS, THE EGG INDUSTRY AND ANIMAL 
WELFARE: A SCIENCE-BASED APPROACH 5, 11 (2014), http://perma.cc/KSE7-ZRLY 
(claiming that use of conventional housing systems—cages—for egg-laying hens 
protects hens from predators, disease, pecking, and aggressive behavior, and that 
cage-free production would require use of more hens to meet egg demand, since 
“more eggs are lost or destroyed in cage-free environments”).
40. Development of the idea of “cognitive dissonance” is attributed to Leon 
Festinger. See, e.g., LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957). 
In 1959, Festinger and Carlsmith reported on an experimental method for generating 
and analyzing cognitive dissonance, and, more recently, fMRI has been used to 
assess brain activity associated with cognitive dissonance. Leon Festinger & James 
M. Carlsmith, Cognitive Consequences of Forced Compliance, 58 J. ABNORMAL &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 203 (1959). An example of fMRI research is that of Vincent van 
Veen et al., Neural Activity Predicts Attitude Change in Cognitive Dissonance, 12 
NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 1469 (2009). 
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the hens who produced those eggs. If we also take seriously research 
showing that many people aware that society is morally incorrect 
about a matter will still yield to social pressure because of the 
extreme discomfort they experience from being in the minority, we 
must accept that there are a lot of people who, for various reasons, 
cannot adopt the perspective of those who seek change in the 
treatment of animals. This would be true regardless of the amount 
and kind of information available. 
So how does an advocate work within a social system that 
normalizes the infliction of suffering on animals and whose members 
all too readily perceive the situation of animals with conformist 
brains that do not absorb information about animal suffering? 
Professor Francione argues that as long as people consume animals 
or products derived from animals, they will not be able to separate 
their own self-interest from the interests of animals.41 I believe he is 
correct, but I also believe that the psychological ties that bind us to 
animal consumption make it difficult for many people to become 
vegan. There is no doubt that some people do process information 
about the extent of animal suffering and consciously change their 
behavior in light of what they learned,42 just as some participants in 
Asch’s and Berns’s experiments resisted conformity. But the 
percentage of people who can or do resist is relatively low; a 
relatively low percentage of Americans are vegans,43 despite ready 
availability of information about environmental, health, and animal-
welfare benefits associated with veganism.44
                                                     
41. E.g., GARY L. FRANCIONE, ANIMALS AS PERSONS: ESSAYS ON THE 
ABOLITION OF ANIMAL EXPLOITATION 12-13 (2008).  
42. Tom Regan writes about the different ways people become vegan. TOM 
REGAN, EMPTY CAGES: FACING THE CHALLENGE OF ANIMAL RIGHTS 21-34 (2004).  
43. Accurate measurement is difficult, but it appears that a relatively small 
percentage of Americans is vegetarian or vegan. See, e.g., Erin Trauth, Is 2014 the 
Year of the Vegan?, ONE GREEN PLANET (Jan. 16, 2014), 
http://www.onegreenplanet.org/news/is-2014-the-year-of-the-vegan/. 
44. See, e.g., 11 Convincing Reasons That Going Vegan Isn’t Crazy,
READER’S DIGEST, http://www.rd.com/health/healthy-eating/going-vegan/# (last 
visited Dec. 18, 2015); Christian Nordqvist, Vegan Diet: Health Benefits of Being 
Vegan, MEDICAL NEWS TODAY (Dec. 2, 2015), http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/ 
articles/149636.php; 57 Health Benefits of Going Vegan, NURSINGDEGREE.NET,
http://www.nursingdegree.net/blog/19/57-health-benefits-of-going-vegan/ (last 
visited Dec. 18, 2015); Rewarded for Being Vegan, GENTLE WORLD (June 27, 2011), 
http://gentleworld.org/rewarded-for-being-vegan/; Kathy Stevens, Longevity, 
Anyone? Top 20 Reasons to Go Vegan During World Vegan Month, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Jan. 25, 2014, 4:01 P.M.), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kathy-
stevens/vegan-diet_b_4282272.html; James McWilliams, The Evidence for a Vegan 
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C. Applications to Animal Advocacy 
One way to address the phenomena of social pressure and of 
striving for internal consistency in one’s beliefs and actions is to 
normalize vegan options such that they are not positioned as counter-
majoritarian choices. Theoretically, if vegan options are available 
and satisfactory enough to serve as a practical and acceptable 
substitute for nonvegan options, social pressure to define “cheese” 
only as “a human food product made from the mammary glands of 
female non-human mammals,” for example, will be less. When 
psychologically freed to make an independent choice because good 
plant-based options are available and others are also choosing those 
options, it is possible that the purchaser will be able to more 
objectively match up a choice of “dairy” cheese with the infliction of 
suffering on cows used to produce milk for humans and the choice of 
plant-based cheese with the absence of that infliction of suffering. 
This second step is dependent on the purchaser reaching a truly 
neutral or vegan-positive point in cheese selection. If researchers at 
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute are correct, a meaningful shift in the 
definition of “cheese” and the conceptual linkage of animal-derived 
cheese with high degrees of human-inflicted suffering can occur 
when as few as 10% of the population holds these ideas as 
unshakeable beliefs.45 Viable, visible vegan options are an important 
part of a behavioral shift that will open possibilities of cognitive and 
cultural shifts. My expectation is that those shifts will further 
respect-oriented rather than use-oriented human–animal 
relationships.  
                                                                                                               
Diet, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/ 
2012/01/the-evidence-for-a-vegan-diet/251498/; Veganism & The Environment: By 
the Numbers [Infographic], LIVING GREEN MAGAZINE (Feb. 13, 2013), 
http://livinggreenmag.com2013/02/13/energy-ecology/veganism-the-environment-
by-the-numbers-infographic/; Environmental Destruction, VEGAN OUTREACH,
http://www.veganoutreach.org/whyvegan/environment.html (last visited Dec. 18, 
2015); Why Go Vegan?, THE VEGAN SOCIETY, https://www.vegansociety.com/try-
vegan/why-go-vegan (last visited Dec. 18, 2015); Top 10 Reasons to Go Vegan in 
the New Year, PETA, http://www.peta.org/living/food/top-10-reasons-go-vegan-
new-year/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2015). 
45. Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Minority Rules: Scientists Discover 
Tipping Point for the Spread of Ideas, SCIENCE DAILY (July 26, 2011), 
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2011/07/110725190044.htm (reporting on J. 
Xie et al., Social Consensus Through the Influence of Committed Minorities, 84 
PHYSICAL REV. E 1 (2011)). 
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All parts of this hypothesis turn on the availability of flavorful, 
appealing vegan choices. In fact, I believe that it is considerably 
more important to have good-tasting vegan options ubiquitously and 
easily available than to have occasional access to good vegan 
recipes, to a practicing vegan, or to a great vegan restaurant, even 
though all of those provide a social context for normalizing vegan 
choices in a nonvegan society. That is primarily because the 
availability of good vegan options will result in more shelf space 
dedicated to those products, and more shelf space allocation implies 
a large enough consumer base to justify the allocation.  
Product placement is also important. If a person finds vegan 
cheeses alongside nonhuman mammary-gland-derived cheeses in the 
refrigerated section of the grocery store, the mere fact of the 
existence of the vegan cheese implies the existence of a reference 
group of people who buy the vegan cheese. Such availability should 
reduce pressure to conform to an expectation that “cheese” must be 
solely a nonhuman-mammary-gland-derived product and that 
everything else is “weird,” thereby opening up the freedom to make 
an independent choice—a choice that might stick and become a 
consumer’s favorite, thereby loosening his/her commitment to the 
idea that s/he “must” have cheese derived from animals. Asch found 
that any break in the unanimity of the group’s decision generated 
more independence of thought among naïve participants.46
The freedom to make an independent choice is important not 
only to reduce social conformity driven by avoidance of minority 
status or conformity driven by altered perception. For the person who 
is empathic enough to be receptive to the suffering of animals, 
psychological freedom to make a choice independent of the 
majority’s choice is important for reducing the internal conflict 
associated with wanting to eat cheese but not wanting to hurt 
animals. If a person can satisfy the desire for cheese without 
purchasing dairy cheese, s/he may more readily process the
information about harms to cows associated with dairy production 
and choose not to participate in that market.  
Vegan food must taste good and be reasonably health-
sustaining to serve as a viable replacement for nonvegan food; it 
must be attractive to enough consumers who value it for its flavor 
and not for its connection to the moral choice it represents in order to 
draw a large enough consumer base to justify a retailer’s allocation 
of precious shelf space. Development and production of good vegan 
                                                     
46. ASCH, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 15, at 476-81. 
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cheese is difficult. Even Americans, the people who brought the 
world Velveeta cheese, balk at vegan cheeses with strange textures, 
unfamiliar flavors, and unpleasant gastrointestinal effects. Also 
significant to retailers is that cheese is perishable and must be thrown 
away if no one buys the product before the relatively short expiration 
date. A small company focused on vegan cheese and without 
considerable capital reserves may have difficulty developing a 
market presence sufficient to transition to an in-store sales 
opportunity, although it appears that consumers are increasingly 
willing to make online purchases that will establish a solid customer 
track record to present to brick-and-mortar retailers. 
Some of these market hurdles are common to all new product 
developers, especially small businesses with minimal capital. 
However, vegan product developers have obstacles beyond customer 
receptivity and product fragility. One is that a retailer might well 
take a chance on a new type of a traditional food, such as a flavored 
potato chip, but not be willing to take a chance with a new type of 
food altogether, such as a vegan cheese. Another is that vegan food 
producers may be subjected to heightened regulatory requirements, 
which are difficult for vegan food producers to understand in any 
way other than as intentional market barriers. 
II. EXAMPLES OF MISSED OPPORTUNITIES FOR ANIMAL ADVOCACY
In Part II, I consider at length a product labeling dispute 
between a cultured cashew cheese producer and the California 
Department of Food and Agriculture. I then turn to problems of food 
distribution and consumer access: a law concerning sale of 
“homemade” products and laws regulating food truck vending.
The product labeling dispute is an important starting point 
because it has overlapping characteristics with the other examples 
presented in this Part. Essentially, vegan food producers are 
attempting to expand the concept of foods traditionally defined 
socioculturally only as animal derivatives. Conceptual flexibility 
creates the space for experimentation with foods that serve a similar 
purpose. Also, all of the vegan businesses I describe in this section 
have market-entry challenges. Finally, the legal work associated with 
these examples is not exclusively and directly connected to reduction 
of animal suffering, which may partially explain why animal 
advocates have been slow to warm to the idea of this type of legal 
work. None of these situations drew the support of legal advocates 
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for animals, yet support for vulnerable vegan businesses can benefit 
animals in multiple ways.  
A. Product Labeling: The Cultured Kitchen 
The Cultured Kitchen (TCK) produces raw fermented vegan 
products, such as cashew cheeses, sauerkrauts, gluten-free chocolate 
donuts, and desserts.47 TCK came to the attention of the California 
Department of Food and Agriculture (CDFA) dairy division because 
of a recent voluntary recall of TCK’s cashew cheese.48 The CDFA 
inspected TCK’s kitchen and reviewed whether TCK is compliant 
with California’s licensing and labeling regulations. According to 
Rebeca Wise, TCK’s majority owner, the CDFA advised TCK that 
TCK would have to be licensed and its cashew cheese products 
relabeled.49 The label could not contain the word “cheese” or any 
misspelling of the word, such as “cheeze.” Further, TCK was told 
that it would have to be licensed to produce a “product resembling a 
milk product,” which would require TCK to produce the cashew 
cheese in a kitchen designed and regulated for processing animal-
derived dairy products. 
From TCK’s perspective as a small start-up company, building 
and maintaining a dairy kitchen is a substantial financial hurdle 
because dairy kitchen requirements greatly exceed regulatory 
requirements for nondairy commercial kitchens. Moreover, there is 
no consumer value gained from the expenditures. TCK was told that 
sterilization and pasteurization equipment would be required, and 
that the kitchen had to have a sloping floor.50 All of these 
requirements are antithetical or irrelevant for the production of raw 
vegan fermented foods.  
                                                     
47. THE CULTURED KITCHEN, http://theculturedkitchen.net/ (last visited 
Nov. 9, 2015). 
48. Press Release, Cal. Dep’t Pub. Health, CDPH Warns Not to Eat the 
Cultured Kitchen’s Cashew Cheese Products Due to Health Risk (Dec. 31, 2013), 
http://perma.cc/336L-XRD9. 
49. Nearly all the information presented in this section regarding the TCK 
case was derived from speaking with Rebeca Wise, majority owner of The Cultured 
Kitchen and its Head Chef and Educator, or from e-mails from Ms. Wise, or from 
conversations with her legal representative. Ms. Wise has reviewed and approved 
this section of the essay that concerns The Cultured Kitchen. E-mail from Rebeca 
Wise to author (Mar. 22, 2014, 12:32 PDT) (on file with author). Occasionally, as 
when quoting from Ms. Wise, a specific e-mail will be identified as the source.  
50. E-mail from Rebeca Wise to author (Mar. 27, 2014, 02:41 PDT) (on file 
with author). 
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Because CDFA officials have declined to put their specific 
requirements as to TCK in writing,51 TCK was confused as to both 
regulatory issues: labeling and licensing. As to labeling, California 
Food and Agricultural Code § 38956 provides that “[n]ondairy 
product containers and labels shall not contain any combination of 
words, symbols, marks, designs, or representations commonly used 
or associated with the sale, advertising, or distribution of milk 
products.”52
Also, according to Richard Estes, staff counsel with the CDFA, 
the Milk and Dairy Food Safety Branch of the CDFA 
considers Cultured Kitchen products labeled as cheese . . . to be a product 
resembling a milk product as it is labeled as a substitute for cheese. (Food 
& Ag. Code, sec. 38903.5). It also qualifies as a product resembling a milk 
product because it “has the appearance, taste, smell, texture or color of a 
milk product.” (Food & Agric. Code, sec. 38912).53
TCK’s labels do contain the word “cheese,” but TCK resisted 
labeling changes because they cannot afford to throw away a large 
run of preprinted containers, their qualified use of “cheese” has not 
been confusing to customers,54 and, most importantly, they want to 
be able to use the word “cheese” as they have been using it for 
customer recognition and self-presentation reasons. TCK argues that 
customers searching for alternatives to dairy cheese will search terms 
such as “alternative cheese,” “nondairy cheese,” or “nut cheese.” 
TCK contends, also, that using a label other than “cashew cheese” is 
misleading to consumers, who would know from use of the word 
“cheese” that the product is fermented (“cultured”) and that it has a 
“cheese-like” texture. Moreover, forcing TCK to use a different word 
                                                     
51. Statement of TCK’s Legal Representative (Mar. 21, 2014). 
52. CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 38956 (West 2001).
53. E-mail from Richard Estes, Staff Counsel, CDFA, to Michael T. 
Roberts, Exec. Dir., UCLA Resnick Program for Food Law and Policy, (Feb. 28, 
2014, 12:43 PST) (on file with author). 
54. The label on the top of The Cultured Kitchen’s cashew cheese products 
clearly stated “Cashew Cheese, Dairy Free,” and all of the (non-dairy) ingredients 
were listed. The tops of the containers can be viewed online at Chashew Cheeze,
THE CULTURED KITCHEN, http://perma.cc/LFC5-XW8J (last visited Nov. 9, 2015). 
The containers are clearly labeled “non-dairy.” The sides of the containers can be 
viewed online in the U.S. Food & Drug Administration’s recall notice at The 
Cultured Kitchen® Voluntarily Recalls Cashew Cheese Due to Possible Risk of 
Contamination from Salmonella Photos, FDA, http://perma.cc/WB65-PZ7X (last 
visited Nov. 9, 2015). In fact, TCK actively markets to consumers who want to 
avoid dairy for various reasons, and so TCK is particularly careful not to confuse 
purchasers as to whether their product contains dairy. E-mail from Rebeca Wise to 
author, supra note 49. 
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to refer to their product, as long as their labels are not misleading, 
seems to TCK to be a violation of a right to present the company and 
its products as they choose.  
In an analogous situation involving the use of “milk” to 
describe nondairy milks, a northern California district court held on 
December 13, 2013, that a reasonable consumer would not be 
confused by clearly labeled “soymilk,” “coconut milk,” and “almond 
milk.”55
Plaintiffs essentially allege that a reasonable consumer would view the 
terms “soymilk” and “almond milk,” disregard the first words in the 
names, and assume that the beverages came from cows. The claim 
stretches the bounds of credulity. Under Plaintiffs’ logic, a reasonable 
consumer might also believe that veggie bacon contains pork, that 
flourless chocolate cake contains flour, or that e-books are made out of 
paper.56  
In that there is a statutory requirement that “[n]ondairy product 
containers . . . not contain any combination of words . . . commonly 
used . . . with . . . milk products,”57 TCK’s situation is different from 
the soymilk lawsuit. Nevertheless, CDFA’s position is still weak to 
the extent that avoidance of consumer confusion is an anchoring 
principle of labeling regulations.  
Besides the question of whether clearly labeled nondairy milk 
product equivalents adequately prevent consumer confusion, there is 
another potential negative effect from allowing the word “cheese” or 
“milk” to appear only on animal-derived products: nonvegan 
consumers’ definition of what constitutes “cheese” cannot expand to 
include nondairy products, resulting in unnecessary delays in the 
normalization of completely satisfactory substitutes for animal-
derived products. If nondairy cheese equivalents cannot be directly 
                                                     
55. Order Granting Motion to Dismiss at 11, Ang v. Whitewave Foods Co.,
2013 WL 6492353 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2013) (No. 3:13-cv-01953). This dispute did 
not involve the California Department of Food and Agriculture (CDRA). The class 
action Plaintiffs claim to be consumers confused by the labeling of nondairy milks, 
and they rest their case on U.S. Food and Drug Administration regulations. Id. at 1-
2, 7. The Court cites the FDA requirement that food be identified by “(1) the name 
prescribed by federal law or regulation, ‘(2) [t]he common or usual name of the 
food; or, in the absence thereof, (3) [a]n appropriately descriptive term, or when the 
nature of the food is obvious, a fanciful name commonly used by the public for such 
food.’” Id. at 8 (citation omitted). The Court then finds that, since there is no 
prescribed name for non-dairy milks, the common or usual name should be used. Id.
at 9. In this case, “milk” qualified with its non-dairy origin would meet the objective 
of avoiding consumer confusion. Id. at 10. 
56. Id. at 11. 
57. CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 38956 (West 2001).
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labeled as such and are relegated to specialized sections of specialty 
markets, they will not serve as an introduction to thinking about and 
experiencing vegan foods as an accepted and acceptable alternative 
to animal-derived products. Conversely, allowing the definition of 
“cheese” to include nondairy cheese will loosen the grip of social 
pressure to reach for animal-derived cheese so that consumers can 
make independent choices without implied or actual social pressure 
to consume only animal-derived cheese. Acceptance of nondairy 
cheese as a reasonable alternative to animal-derived cheese can then 
loosen the investment consumers have in eating animal-derived 
products. It would enable them to more objectively process 
information about the suffering inflicted on animals for the 
production of products consumers would know from experience are 
not necessary for flavor or nutrition.  
Even if using the word “cheese” were okay, the product would 
still be a “product that resembles a milk product” because of its 
flavor, texture, and color. As to such products, Mr. Estes has stated 
that: 
[T]he Cultured Kitchen must comply with the sanitary requirements for 
the operation of a milk products plant to manufacture [products 
resembling milk products] as set forth in Food and Agricultural Code 
sections 33761 through 33782. Food and Agricultural Code section 33782 
states that they apply to “any building or structure in which any product 
resembling a milk product is manufactured, processed or compounded.58  
He also maintains that a dairy kitchen has to be maintained as a 
matter of licensing requirements.59 Yet, the burden on TCK to 
comply with the requirement of a dairy kitchen would greatly exceed 
the benefit to be obtained from treating a nondairy product like a 
dairy product, unless the actual goal is hindering the development of 
competitors with the animal-derived dairy industry. It is important to 
note that these requirements are additional to other regulatory 
requirements designed to ensure availability of clean, safe products. 
TCK is already subject to California’s Department of Health 
regulations and inspections.60 The CDFA dairy division thus 
represents yet another regulatory agency, one whose requirements 
are not just redundant and unnecessary to maintain standards of 
cleanliness and product safety for TCK; they are irrationally 
                                                     
58. E-mail from Richard Estes to Michael T. Roberts, supra note 53. 
59. Interview with Michael T. Roberts, Exec. Dir., UCLA Resnick Program 
for Food Law and Policy, in L.A., Cal. (Mar. 21, 2014) (on file with author). 
60. E-mail from Rebeca Wise to author (Mar. 7, 2014, 12:34 PDT) (on file 
with author). 
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burdensome because TCK does not produce animal-derived dairy 
products at all. TCK will most likely survive because a loyal 
consumer base had already been established before CDFA came on 
the scene, but the expense and time involved in compliance often 
could break a fledgling company, preventing its products from 
reaching market, preventing consumer access to products they are 
seeking, and delaying shift in the cultural definition of “cheese.” 
TCK’s legal representative brought to CDFA’s attention the 
fact that the requirement to build out a specialized kitchen for the 
production of animal-derived dairy products, including equipment 
for pasteurization and sterilization, would be inappropriate and 
burdensome for this small business whose products do not actually 
include any animal-derived products at all.61 One CDFA official said 
that the CDFA has statutory authority to require maintenance of a 
complete dairy kitchen with sterilization and pasteurization 
equipment even in the case of a producer of fermented products that 
would be destroyed by either process.62 Another CDFA official 
agreed that there is broad statutory authority but said that the CDFA 
would only require a kitchen build-out appropriate for the particular 
product.63 What is clear from both of these officials is CDFA’s 
position that it has complete statutory authority and broad discretion 
to place on TCK whatever requirements it deems appropriate 
because TCK’s product “resembles a milk product.”  
Ultimately, the CDFA stuck to its stringent reading of the 
statutes, forcing TCK to change its labeling or sue.64 TCK had been 
unable to operate for a substantial period of time due to CDFA 
delays in response, could not afford to litigate, and changed its label. 
It is vulnerable vegan businesses like this one—which have a good 
case according to reliable legal counsel but cannot afford to pursue 
litigation—that deserve the support of animal lawyers. This is 
particularly true when the outcome promises to redefine a food 
                                                     
61. E-mail from Michael T. Roberts, Exec. Dir., UCLA Resnick Program 
for Food Law and Policy, to Rebeca Wise (Mar. 21, 2014, 3:32 PDT) (on file with 
author). 
62. Interview with Michael T. Roberts, supra note 59. 
63. Id.
64. TCK’s cultured “cheese” products are now called “Raw Cultured 
Cashew.” Semi-Firm Herbs De Provence—Raw Cultured Cashew—Formerly Called 
Cashew Cheeze, THE CULTURED KITCHEN, https://culturedkitchen.myshopify.com/ 
collections/frontpage/products/semi-firm-herbs-de-provence-raw-cultured-cashew-
formerly-called-cashew-cheeze (last visited Nov. 9, 2015). 
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product from exclusively animal-derived to one that includes plant-
derived forms as well. 
CDFA’s official position can be characterized simply as a 
literal focus on an argument that “products resembling a milk 
product”65 must meet particular animal-based dairy product standards 
because they fall into the same category as animal-derived products 
or because of greater risk of consumer confusion or consumer lack of 
familiarity with safety standards for vegan, raw, or fermented foods. 
However, some producers who have been hit with compliance raids, 
requirements for dairy kitchen equipment unnecessary for the 
production of their products, and pressure to change labels believe 
that a primary motive is protection of dairy industry interests.66 Titles 
of CDFA officials responsible for these matters do nothing to dispel 
that belief. For instance, the CDFA official who first visited TCK’s 
kitchen at the time had the title of “Dairy Foods Specialist, Milk & 
Dairy Food Safety Branch, CDFA,”67 and that official’s supervisor’s
title was “Dairy Program Coordinator, CDFA, Milk and Dairy Food 
Safety Branch.”68  
In fact, CDFA has no specific regulations or guidelines for the 
production of raw, fermented, or vegan foods, and there is no 
division in the CDFA organized specifically to oversee the 
production of such foods. By default, “products resembling milk 
products” fall within a framework designed for regulation of dairy 
products.  
TCK does not resist regulation. In fact, Ms. Wise of TCK 
supports product-appropriate regulation for raw fermented foods: 
I don’t think the CDFA dairy division should regulate raw vegan foods, 
because they have no interest in seeing vegan companies succeed. The[ir] 
interest is the opposite. I think in America every food producer should 
have access to the technology and support from officials to produce the 
safest product possible. When I was looking up the category of what type 
                                                     
65. CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE §§ 38901, 38902, 38903, 38903.5, 38915, 
38924 (West 2001).
66. This was explained to me by Ajna Sharma-Wilson, an attorney involved 
in legal issues pertaining to raw food production. Ms. Sharma-Wilson added that the 
broad discretion the CDFA believes it holds under the current statutory framework 
results in a lack of clarity about what producers are required to do and leads to 
apprehension about unfair application of that discretion. Interview with Ajna 
Sharma-Wilson (Jan. 11, 2014). 
67. E-mail from Rebeca Wise to author (Jan. 16, 2014, 16:30 PDT) (on file 
with author).  
68. Rebeca Wise identified the name of the individual with oversight in her 
e-mail. E-mail from Rebeca Wise to author, supra note 49. 
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of food producer we should register as, there was not a category for raw 
non animal based foods. But the movement of eating that way is growing 
and there needs to be safe/affordable guidelines put in place for the start 
up companies that will be coming forward.  
Nut cheeses are not going away even if the [dairy industry] wants them 
to. . . . My fear is if we continue to slam producers, over regulate them, 
and make it impossible for them to stay in business, [i]t will create an over 
growth of radical producers and people creating in the[ir] own homes 
products that could cause potential health risks to themselves and others. 
Such would be a human tragedy.69
It would surely delay acceptance of fermented raw products if 
there were illness outbreaks associated with consumption of certain 
improperly prepared products. Indeed, news media were not shy 
about vilifying TCK products. Despite the facts that TCK recalled its 
products when there was no proof of contamination and no final 
results that their products made anyone ill,70 media accusations 
greatly affected TCK’s customer relationships, including those with 
vendor-distributors of their products.71
The hurdles TCK experienced are arguably the most thorny a 
small artisanal business could face because fermenting foods 
involves the deliberate introduction and culturing of bacteria in foods 
sold for human consumption—in a culture traditionally obsessed 
with destroying bacteria. Similarly, unfermented raw food producers 
come up against the obstacle that American regulators persist in a 
belief that raw foods, especially raw milk, carry greater risk of 
contamination such that even consumers who intentionally seek out 
raw milk should be protected from their misguided consumption 
choices.  
One cannot dismiss the TCK dispute as simply the result of 
bias against raw and fermented food producers. Many small artisanal 
businesses suffer similar difficulty because American state regulators 
tend to think that small-scale food production poses greater public 
health and safety risks.72 Since there is little to support that bias, there 
is room for artisanal producers to believe that large food producers 
are able to commandeer regulatory agencies to gain protection from 
competition presented by small artisanal producers. Big producers 
seem willing to aggressively defend the definition of food products 
                                                     
69. E-mail from Rebeca Wise to author (Jan. 13, 2014, 14:23 PST) (on file 
with author). 
70. E-mail from Rebeca Wise to author, supra note 49. 
71. Id. 
72. Interview with Michael T. Roberts, supra note 59. 
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that have traditionally contained animal products. For instance, 
Unilever sued Just Mayo, which produces mayonnaise without 
eggs.73
This situation should concern animal advocates because good 
vegan products—products that can shift the definition of what 
constitutes a particular type of food—often originate from the ranks 
of artisanal producers who believe in the value of their products, 
despite financial risks and difficulties marketing to a largely 
nonvegan population—risks a large corporate food producer may be 
unwilling to take.  
B. Product Distribution: California’s Homemade Food Act and Food 
Truck Regulation in New York City and Los Angeles 
Product labeling is only one of many hurdles to securing 
customer awareness and loyalty. The product has to be available for 
consumers to purchase. Consider the small artisanal producer, such 
as TCK, that sells at farmers’ markets until a sufficient loyal 
consumer base is established to warrant approaching local grocers 
for shelf space. With sufficient showing of enough unit sales, a 
retailer may be willing to allocate shelf space even though doing so 
could result in a lower rate of return than allocating that space to a 
producer of a traditionally appealing product with a documented 
higher sales volume.  
Once vegan food is visible alongside nonvegan alternatives, 
shoppers receive the message that the vegan food is a viable choice 
and may give it a try. Over time, vegan products will improve in 
flavor, variety, and price. Consumers will develop a taste for such 
products and establish brand loyalties. Consumers’ reliance on 
animal-derived products and the processes perceived as “necessary” 
to produce them may loosen sufficiently that their willingness to 
back animal-supportive changes, including legal changes, will 
                                                     
73. Major Anglo-Dutch multinational corporation Unilever had sued a 
small San Francisco-based company, Hampton Creek, for using the name “mayo” to 
market its egg-free mayonnaise, but Unilever dropped the suit in December 2014, 
allowing Hampton Creek to work out any issues with industry groups and regulatory 
authorities. Ben Rooney, Unilever Lays an Egg: Drops Just Mayo Lawsuit, CNN
MONEY (Dec. 19, 2014, 11:12 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/12/19/news/ 
companies/mayo-lawsuit-unilever/; Hellman’s Owner Unilever Cracks over Egg-
Free Just Mayo Lawsuit, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 19, 2014, 2:59 AM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/dec/19/hellmans-unilever-drops-egg-
free-just-mayo-lawsuit (“Anglo-Dutch firm drops legal claim that rival’s use of 
‘mayo’ amounted to false advertising as mayonnaise must contain egg.”).
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increase. This is the predictive pathway that supports legal assistance 
to vegan businesses as a means of animal advocacy for humane use 
of animals or abolition of the use of animals altogether.  
Selling food to the public is highly regulated and not simply a 
matter of setting up a lemonade stand or reserving a space at a local 
farmers’ market. State and local consumer protection regulations, as 
well as each farmers’ market regulations, impose direct and indirect 
costs that increase costs of production and, ultimately, costs to 
consumers. For example, TCK operates in California where food 
sellers have been required to prepare food in commercial kitchens. 
Small start-up entrepreneurs, including many manufacturers of vegan 
foods, have had to add the cost of renting commercial kitchen space 
and bear the risk that sufficient commercial kitchen space is 
available when needed.74 This increases the relative cost of artisanal 
products compared to products of the same type produced by larger 
scale operations with sufficient resources to own commercial kitchen 
space. Large-scale operations already enjoy competitive benefits of 
scale, such as bulk purchasing of ingredients. 
In 2012, California enacted legislation75 to exempt from the 
commercial kitchen requirement “nonpotentially hazardous food[]”76
producers lawfully permitted to operate a “cottage food” business 
and grossing less than $50,000 per year from food sales.77 The 
legislative findings and declaration of Chapter 415, Statutes of 2012, 
list as reasons for its enactment such considerations as the role of 
small-scale food producers in reducing the prevalence of obesity, 
increasing access to health-sustaining food, and the fact that “[a]t 
least 32 other states have passed laws that allow small business 
entrepreneurs to use their home kitchens to prepare, for sale, foods 
that are not potentially hazardous.”78 These laws may not be 
sufficient to protect small-scale producers unless they preempt 
individual farmers’ market regulations or local government 
                                                     
74. The closest commercial kitchen to Cheryl Gaines, a southern California 
producer of jams, jellies, sauces, and seasonings, has been the Ronald McDonald 
commercial kitchen. However, she cannot easily reserve the kitchen for use during 
the height of the berry season because it is being used by children attending the 
Ronald McDonald camp where the kitchen is located. Cheryl Gaines, Statement at 
the Santa Monica Farmers’ Market (Sept. 30, 2015).
75. 2012 Cal. Stat. ch. 415 (originally introduced as California Assembly 
Bill 1616 (2012)). 
76. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 114365.5 (West 2012 & Supp. 2015). 
77. § 113758(a). 
78. 2012 Cal. Stat. ch. 415, § 1(f) (2012).  
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regulations, but they represent increasing awareness and attempts to 
reduce market-entry challenges experienced by such producers.79
Animal welfare is not on the list of justifications for the law. In 
fact, one of my animal law advocate acquaintances privately scorned 
this particular bill as trivial relative to authoring directly animal-
protective legislation. Yet, animals do benefit from this legal change, 
and that would be true even if it were not the case that nondairy, 
nonmeat food items are more likely to be identified as 
“nonpotentially hazardous foods.”80 Both vegan and nonvegan small-
scale producers of nonpotentially hazardous foods benefit from this 
relaxation of the requirements, but vegan producers arguably benefit 
more because farmers’ market sales can reassure brick-and-mortar 
retailers to take a chance on a vegan food product. For example, a 
nonvegan chocolate chip cookie producer does not have to show that 
consumers will buy nonvegan chocolate chip cookies; consumers 
already buy them. That producer has to show only that consumers 
will buy a particular nonvegan chocolate chip cookie. On the other 
hand, a vegan chocolate chip cookie producer does have to provide 
evidence that consumers will buy vegan chocolate chip cookies at all 
because there are relatively few such cookies on the market. A vegan 
chocolate chip cookie producer thus has to show both that consumers 
will buy vegan cookies in general and these chocolate chip cookies 
in particular. 
Similarly, food truck regulation can limit the development of 
consumer appreciation for vegan food. The owners of Cinnamon 
Snail, a successful kosher–vegan food truck operating in and around 
New York City,81 finally gave up their food truck because of 
                                                     
79. For example, many local farmers’ markets in southern California still 
require use of a commercial kitchen even for the production of “nonpotentially 
hazardous foods.” Even more restrictive markets allow the sale of products from 
commercial kitchens only if the producer herself has numerous licenses that only 
commercial producers, and not most small-scale farmer/vendors, can afford to 
obtain. Newly enacted California legislation creates even more requirements for 
small-scale farmer/vendors who sell at farmers’ markets. CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE
§§ 43100, 47000, 47000.5, 47001, 47002, 47004, 47010, 47011, 47020, 47021 
(West Supp. 2015); see also Assemb. B. 1871, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014), 
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201320140AB18
71.
  According to one such vendor, the law reduces the efficacy of The 
California Homemade Foods Act and places particular burdens on some, such as 
jam and jelly producers, but not other farmer/vendors. Gaines, supra note 74. 
80. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 114365.5 (West 2012 & Supp. 2015). 
81. In 2014, Yelp identified Cinnamon Snail as “the 4th best eatery in 
America.” Jessie Katz, Kosher Vegan Food Truck Rolls to a Stop, FORWARD (Feb. 
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difficulty reliably securing permits to operate on New York City 
streets.82 In order to own and operate a food truck in New York State, 
one must apply for a Mobile Food Vendor License, apply for 
Authority to Collect Sales Tax in New York, file quarterly as to 
collected sales taxes even if no sales have been made, pass a 
Department of Health eight-hour food-handling course, and obtain a 
Mobile Food Vending Permit.83 Securing a Mobile Food Vending 
Permit is difficult because only a certain number of such permits are 
allowed at any one time,84 and those with existing permits can renew 
indefinitely.85 This results in an exceedingly long waitlist for permits, 
leaving few alternatives.86 One alternative is to apply for a permit to 
sell only in New York City parks,87 which would not enable as broad 
                                                                                                               
22, 2015), http://forward.com/food/215243/kosher-vegan-food-truck-rolls-to-a-stop/.
Another sign of its success is that the owner has a cookbook (ADAM SOBEL, STREET 
VEGAN: RECIPES AND DISPATCHES FROM THE CINNAMON SNAIL FOOD TRUCK (2015)) 
and will be opening a brick-and-mortar restaurant built on the success of Cinnamon 
Snail. Rebecca Fishbein, R.I.P. Cinnamon Snail Truck, GOTHAMIST (Feb. 14, 2015, 
4:45 PM), http://gothamist.com/2015/02/14/rip_cinnamon_snail_truck.php. 
82. Fishbein, supra note 81 (“At the end of this month, on February 28th[, 
2015], our permit expires, and there is not a new one available to us. I have 
thoroughly explored every possible way to continue having our truck(s) on the 
streets, but it’s time for a change for us.” (quoting owner Adam Sobel)). Sobel 
mentions other significant challenges of running a food truck, but failure to secure a 
permit was the final blow. Id.
83. See generally RULES OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, tit. 24, tit. IV, pt. A, 
art. 89, especially §§ 89.01-89.19, http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/ 
about/healthcode/health-code-article89.pdf; Food Protection Course for Mobile 
Vendors, OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF THE CITY OF N.Y., https://www1.nyc.gov/ 
nycbusiness/description/food-protection-course-for-mobile-vendors (last visited 
Nov. 9, 2015). 
84. Adam Davidson, The Food-Truck Business Stinks, N.Y. TIMES MAG. 
(May 7, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/12/magazine/the-food-truck-
business-stinks.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (“In the ‘80s, the city capped the 
number of carts and trucks at 3,000 (plus 1,000 more from April to October).”).
85. Ilya Marritz, Broken Permitting System Forces Food Trucks into Black 
Market, WNYC NEWS (June 6, 2012), http://www.wnyc.org/story/214757-food-
trucks/. 
86. “[T]here are so many names on the wait list (more than 2,000) that the 
Department of Health hasn’t taken names since 2007.” Id. Moreover, positions on 
the waiting list are not transferable, just as permits and licenses are not. See RULES 
OF THE CITY OF N.Y., tit. 24, ch. 19, § 19-11, http://rules.cityofnewyork.us/content/ 
section-19-11-eligibility-apply-mobile-food-vending-unit-permit. 
87. Such permits are called Restricted Area Mobile Food Vending (MFV) 
permits. See Mobile Food Vending Unit Permit (Seasonal or Two-Year), OFFICIAL 
WEBSITE OF THE CITY OF N.Y., https://www1.nyc.gov/nycbusiness/description/ 
mobile-food-vending-unit-permit-seasonal-or-twoyear/about (last visited Nov. 9, 
2015). 
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a consumer base. Another solution is to purchase a permit on the 
black market, which is risky because the permits are legally 
nontransferable yet can cost as much as $20,000.88 A final solution is 
to rent a permit, which is also illegal.89
This set of legal rules and circumstances led one observer to 
claim: 
Over the past few years, the economic and community impact of food 
trucks has only been positive, yet the stifling nature of mobile food vendor 
laws may be preventing the industry from thriving even more. The [New 
York City Food Truck Association] pointed out that its 50 food truck 
members contributed more than $2 million to the [New York City] budget 
in 2011, and anticipated a contribution of $3 million in 2012.90
Unlike the District of Columbia, which established a lottery system 
to enable vendors to “win” opportunities to sell in popular places, 
New York City has yet to establish an alternative, fair system to the 
one that allows unlimited renewals by holders of a limited number of 
permits.91
The consequence of scarce lawful access to Mobile Food 
Vending Permits means that a commercially viable food truck, such 
as a vegan food truck, cannot enter the competitive market, while 
relatively less viable or valued food trucks can continue to hold 
permits simply because those owners acquired permits early on. 
Because vegan food, as compared to many other types of food sold
from food trucks, is a relative newcomer to the American gustatory 
scene, vegan food trucks suffer a greater disadvantage. That 
disadvantage is significant considering how difficult it is to establish 
a brick-and-mortar restaurant dedicated to a type of food not eaten by 
most Americans. It is also significant because a mobile source of 
good-tasting vegan food could inspire people in all walks of life in 
                                                     
88. Joyce Lam, What’s It Take to Become a Food Truck Vendor in NYC?,
UNTAPPED CITIES (July 11, 2013, 9:00 AM), http://untappedcities.com/2013/07/11/ 
whats-it-takes-to-become-a-food-truck-vendor-in-nyc/; see also RULES OF THE CITY 
OF NEW YORK, tit. 24, tit. IV, pt. A, art. 89, § 89.17. 
89. Lam, supra note 88. 
90. Id. See also the New York City Food Truck Association website, which 
includes in its FAQ section links to government requirements. FAQ, N.Y.C. FOOD
TRUCK ASS’N, http://www.nycfoodtrucks.org/faq (last visited Nov. 9, 2015). 
91. Eleanor Mueller, Cities Struggle to Develop Fair Food-Truck Rules,
USA TODAY (Dec. 11, 2014, 5:12 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/ 
nation/2014/12/11/food-truck-regulations/20215643/ (“Officials in the District of 
Columbia last year established a food truck lottery system that mobile food vendors 
can enter to ‘win’ parking spots at popular locations like the National Mall each 
month.”).
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all parts of a city to try plant-based alternatives to animal-based 
foods. Loosening of commitment to animal-based foods as an 
“essential” part of the American diet loosens the perception of 
“necessity” to exploit animals for human nutritional purposes. Since 
American state anticruelty statutes are framed in terms of avoidance 
of “unnecessary” harm to animals, a change in the sociocultural 
context of “necessity” to harm animals for food production could 
ultimately have significant legal effects.92
Food truck regulation is not unique to New York City; it is 
increasing and controversial in many jurisdictions.93 In California, 
despite state laws providing that it is legal to sell food from vehicles 
parked on city streets94 and that state law preempts local laws except 
as to local laws that further public safety,95 at least two 
municipalities, Santa Ana and the City of Los Angeles, enacted 
ordinances limiting the length of time that a food truck can remain in 
one location.96 In Los Angeles, city ordinances required food trucks 
in residential areas to move at least half a mile every thirty minutes 
                                                     
92. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2910(A)(3) (West 2012) (“A
person commits cruelty to animals if the person does any of the following . . . 
[i]ntentionally, knowingly or recklessly inflicts unnecessary physical injury to any 
animal.”); WASH. REV. CODE § 16.52.207 (2011) (“A person is guilty of animal 
cruelty in the second degree if, under circumstances not amounting to first degree 
animal cruelty, the person knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence inflicts 
unnecessary suffering or pain upon an animal.”).  
93. Food truck vending is increasing in municipalities throughout the 
United States, generating various types of regulations intended to balance the 
interests of brick-and-mortar restaurateurs and their mobile competitors. See id.
94. CAL. VEH. CODE § 22455(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2012). 
95. Id. §§ 21, 22455(b). 
96. Santa Ana’s ordinance was successfully challenged in 2006 in Vasquez 
v. City of Santa Ana, described by Ingrid Eagly in her thoughtful, informative article 
about litigation on behalf of a food truck entrepreneur who challenged the City of 
Los Angeles’s similar ordinance. Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Clinics in the Pursuit of 
Immigrant Rights: Lessons from the Loncheros, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 91, 97-98 
(2012). In 1991, Los Angeles first enacted an ordinance limiting the time a food 
truck could remain at a particular location in the city, but it was rarely enforced and, 
in any case, the law allowed vendors to return immediately once they had moved. Id.
at 95. Then in 2006, Los Angeles changed the laws such that vendors could not 
return immediately, and began enforcing the laws with fines. L.A. MUN. CODE
§ 80.73(b)(2)(F) (2011) (effective July 23, 2006) (lunch trucks parked in residential 
areas must move at least one-half mile every thirty minutes; lunch trucks parked in 
commercial areas must move at least one-half mile every hour). Los Angeles County 
also enacted a time limit for food truck operation. L.A. CTY. CODE § 7.62.070 (2011) 
(during any three-hour block of time, lunch trucks could operate only thirty minutes 
in residential zones or sixty minutes in a commercial zone). 
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and not to return to the previous location for at least thirty minutes.97
Food trucks in commercial districts could sell food in the same 
parked location for as long as sixty minutes but then had to move at 
least half a mile away and not return to the previous location for at 
least sixty minutes.98 In addition to substantial fines for violations of 
the Code provisions,99 these regulations adversely impacted costs of 
operation and consumer access. Imagine patiently waiting in line to 
purchase food only to have the truck pull away as you reach the 
counter.  
Because California state law prohibits local regulation of 
mobile food vending operations except for public safety reasons,100
the City of Los Angeles had to justify this set of rules on public 
health and safety grounds.101 The City argued that the regulation 
promoted public safety by preventing groups of people from 
gathering, which increases criminal activity in neighborhoods.102
Ultimately, that reasoning did not convince the judge as to the Los 
Angeles City ordinance,103 just as it had not persuaded the judge as to 
the similar Santa Ana City ordinance.104
Several food trucks in Los Angeles serve vegan food, yet 
protecting food trucks was not identified by animal lawyers as a 
cause connected to their advocacy mission. After all, removing food 
truck barriers would provide access to nonvegan food trucks as well 
as vegan food trucks. Yet, there are few equally effective, 
                                                     
97. L.A. MUN. CODE §§ 80.73(b)(1)(B), 80.73(b)(2)(F). 
98. See §§ 80.73(b)(1)(B), 80.73(b)(2)(F). 
99. § 89.60 (providing for fines as high as $371).  
100. CAL. VEH. CODE § 22455(b) (West 2000 & Supp. 2012). 
101. In California there are many state, county, and municipal regulations 
concerning public health and safety. For a brief description, see Eagly, supra note 
96, at 94-96. The challenge for the City of Los Angeles in this case was to justify 
durational parking limits as a matter of public health or safety. Arguably, requiring 
food trucks to move frequently increases, rather than reduces, risk.  
102. The “broken windows” theory of policing and its role in L.A. City’s
defense of the food truck ordinance is described and considered at length by Eagly.
Id. at 97. 
103. Id. at 108 n.104 (quoting Gonzalez v. City of L.A. Dep’t of Transp., No. 
09K08413 (L.A. Cty. Super. Ct. June 5, 2009)).  
104. Id. at 98 n.42 (quoting Minute Order Granting Entry of Preliminary 
Injunction at 12, Vasquez v. City of Santa Ana (Orange Cty. Super. Ct. Aug. 18, 
2006) (No. 05CC13450)) (“[T]he City of Santa Ana has not demonstrated a specific 
public safety issue . . . with the activities of the vendors. . . . Absent a specific 
verifiable public safety problem, the court cannot say that either of the solutions, by 
regulating their hours or requiring their movement, meets the requirements of a 
public safety exception to the clearly preempted area of street vending.”).
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economically viable means of introducing vegan food to a broad 
sector of society besides through food trucks. Even if animal 
protectors believe that they can free-ride on advocacy for food truck 
operators, it is not clear that food truck operators have a great deal of 
access to legal advocates.105 Moreover, an animal-protective advocate 
might approach food truck advocacy differently than a food-truck-
focused representative. For example, the animal advocate might not 
care about a rule limiting a food truck vendor to particular districts 
on particular days if unlimited parking is allowed on the particular 
days the vendor is allowed to sell in specific districts. The food truck 
representative would likely want no restrictions, which might be a 
harder sell, except in the case of a fortuitous state law such as 
California’s, which prohibits local regulation for reasons other than 
public health and safety.  
III. WHY HAVE ANIMAL LAWYERS NOT EMBRACED THIS TYPE OF 
ADVOCACY?
My claim is that representation of vegan businesses benefits 
animals by using existing sociocultural preferences for capitalism 
and business solutions to social problems, by avoiding disputes about 
the limits of (animal) property ownership, and, ultimately, by serving 
to increase consumer willingness to accept legal change that protects 
animals. If my claim is valid, why have animal lawyers not explored 
this pathway to any great extent? Part of it may simply be that there 
were previously too few vegan businesses to assist and too few 
animal lawyers to deal with existing severe, human-inflicted 
suffering. That there are signs of increasing willingness to assist 
producers of vegan products106 might be the result in an increase in 
                                                     
105. Food truck vending is not typically associated with high net income, 
and it is likely that vendors cannot individually, or perhaps even collectively as 
organizations, hire private attorneys to represent their interests. The UCLA Law 
School Criminal Defense Clinic represented food truck entrepreneur Francisco 
Gonzalez in contesting the Los Angeles City ordinances under which he had been 
fined and the Institute for Justice has identified food truck vendor defense as a 
priority area. See Eagly, supra note 96, at 105. This is not to say that private 
attorneys do not represent food truck vendors. See id. at 97 n.40; see also Mueller, 
supra note 91 (describing a lawsuit brought by a Chicago food truck vendor, Laura 
Pekarik). It is to say only that it is not clear that doing so is financially viable or that 
there are many attorneys willing to represent food truck vendors.  
106. See, for example, the newly formed Vegan Trade Council, which, 
among other objectives, seeks to provide legal assistance in various ways. About Us,
1552 Michigan State Law Review  2015:1521 
the number of such producers and the number of legal advocates for 
animals. 
Despite those signs of change, based on conversations I had 
with a few animal lawyers in the context of The Cultured Kitchen 
dispute with the CDFA, I suspect that for such animal advocates, the 
immediacy of existing animals’ suffering remains more compelling 
and inspires more urgency than future-oriented advocacy. Lawyers 
working in animal law want to help animals first and foremost, not 
human entrepreneurs. The expectation that entrepreneurs have or 
should have resources sufficient to protect their interests is strong. 
Also at play may be concerns about the unknowns associated with 
enterprises not owned and operated by those who care about animal 
protection. For instance, drone technology might turn out to be 
important in making zoos obsolete, but drone technology could also 
be used for sport hunting.107 Working to ban drone-facilitated hunting 
might seem a much more valuable use of an animal lawyer’s limited 
time than assisting a company that may not have commitments to 
future cruelty-free developments and uses.108
Animal lawyers whose goal is reducing animal suffering and 
not elimination of use of animals might think vegan business 
representation too distant from their objective, but loosening 
consumer commitment to animal product consumption might well 
loosen consumer support of current legal rules that greatly advantage 
producers that inflict high levels of suffering on animals while 
turning animals into consumption goods. Certainly, there are many 
opportunities for legal work in support of vegan businesses, as the 
previous examples illustrate.109
                                                                                                               
VEGAN TRADE COUNCIL, http://www.vegantradecouncil.com/about-us.html (last 
visited Nov. 9, 2015). 
107. See sources cited in last paragraph in supra note 6. 
108. Several states have taken steps to ban sport hunting with drones. Robert 
Gearty, Eyes in the Air: States Move to Ban Drone-Assisted Hunting, FOXNEWS.COM
(Mar. 25, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/science/2014/03/25/eyes-in-air-states-
move-to-ban-drone-assisted-hunting/; see also Shea, supra note 6; Wildlife Officials 
Take on Drone Hunting Controversy, CBS DENVER (Jan. 9, 2014, 9:55 PM), 
http://denver.cbslocal.com/2014/01/09/wildlife-officials-take-on-drone-hunting-
controversy/ (discussing wildlife officials’ views about the ethics and effects of 
drones on hunting).  
109. See, e.g., Bernardo Teixeira, Investing in a Plant-Based Future,
SEEKING ALPHA (June 16, 2015, 8:54 AM) http://seekingalpha.com/article/3261725-
investing-in-a-plant-based-future (describing good options for investment in 
enterprises that produce vegan options but describing, also, challenges faced by such 
enterprises). 
Value of Vegan Business Representation 1553 
The greater mystery is why abolitionists—attorneys who 
oppose exploitation of animals for human purposes no matter how 
kindly an animal might be treated—would not have started 
representing vegan enterprises in greater numbers earlier on. 
Abolitionist lawyers have used their skills to secure access to vegan 
food by vegan incarcerated individuals,110 to legally allow dissenting 
students to complete science courses without having to perform 
surgeries or kill animals,111 and to protect the free speech rights of 
those protesting animal experimentation, for instance.112
An entirely different abolitionist approach seeks legal 
recognition of individual animals’ legal personhood. This would 
seem to be a promising direct approach, particularly since scientists 
have confirmed similarity between some animal species and humans 
with respect to capacities through which humans have defined 
themselves as unique. If there are limited resources with which to 
provide legal assistance to animals, this might seem more promising 
than support of vegan entrepreneurs because it is more direct. If 
animals’ legal personhood is recognized, they could initiate legal 
proceedings to change how they are treated.  
Two recent lawsuits are worth brief exploration to understand 
the promise and limits of this attractive advocacy pathway. Both 
suits were brought to alter the property status of animals by calling 
                                                     
110. See, e.g., David Cassuto, You’ll Eat It and Like It: Rehabbing Vegans in 
Texas Prisons, ANIMAL BLAWG (Feb. 27, 2011), https://animalblawg.wordpress. 
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https://www.vrg.org/journal/vj2001mar/2001marprison.htm. 
111. See, e.g., Sarah Lyall, Student Sues SUNY on Frog Dissection, N.Y.
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112. See, e.g., Activists Challenge Animal Rights Terrorism Law as a 
Violation of Free Speech, CTR. FOR CONST. RTS. (Dec. 15, 2011), 
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attorneys) representing animal rights activists on free speech grounds outside the 
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Challenging Miami-Dade Police Restrictions on Animal Rights Advocates at Miami 
Seaquarium, ACLU (Jun. 2, 2015), https://www.aclu.org/news/aclu-files-lawsuit-
challenging-miami-dade-police-restrictions-animal-rights-advocates-miami; and 
Beau Yarbrough, Cal Poly Pomona Student Sues over ‘Free Speech Zone,’ DAILY 
BULL. (Apr. 9, 2015, 11:41 AM), http://www.dailybulletin.com/social-affairs/ 
20150409/cal-poly-pomona-student-sues-over-free-speech-zone (vegan student 
activist represented by Foundation for Individual Rights in Education (FIRE)). 
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for judicial recognition of animals as legal persons. One is PETA’s 
2011-2012 lawsuit to free five named orca plaintiffs owned by 
SeaWorld.113 PETA’s argument is that the orcas are persons illegally 
held by SeaWorld in violation of the U.S. Constitution’s Thirteenth 
Amendment, which prohibits slavery and involuntary servitude.114
Another such lawsuit is The Nonhuman Rights Project’s habeas 
corpus petition, filed in 2013, which argues that chimpanzee 
plaintiffs Hercules and Leo are legal persons illegally detained and 
confined by Stonybrook University (for research purposes).115 Both 
lawsuits are premised on the idea that the animals involved are legal 
persons awaiting legal recognition of that fact by common law courts 
in the United States.  
In the orca lawsuit, the court held that the Thirteenth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution applies only to humans.116 In the 
chimpanzee lawsuit, a lower court ordered Stonybrook to show cause 
as to how it is lawfully holding Hercules and Leo117 but ultimately 
refused to recognize Hercules’s and Leo’s liberty interest.118 Judicial 
denial of the legal personhood claims raised by PETA and The 
Nonhuman Rights Project does not mean that animals will not be 
recognized as legal persons eventually. Recognition of a right to 
                                                     
113. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Tilikum v. Sea World 
Parks & Entm’t., Inc., 842 F. Supp. 2d 1259 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (No. 3:11-cv-02476). 
114. Id. at 1.  
115. Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 1-2, Nonhuman Rights 
Project, Inc. v. Stanley, 2015 WL 1812988 (N.Y. Cty. Sup. Ct. April 21, 2015) (No. 
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116. Tilikum, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 1264. 
117. Order to Show Cause & Writ of Habeas Corpus at 2, Nonhuman Rights 
Project, Inc., 2015 WL 1812988 (Index No. 152736/2015), 
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(Apr. 20, 2015), http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/2015/04/20/judge-
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In a similar, habeas corpus lawsuit, a court ruled that it would “not recognize a 
chimpanzee as a human or as a person . . . who can seek a writ of habeas corpus.”
Transcript of Oral Argument at 26, Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. ex rel. Tommy v. 
Lavery, No. 02051 (Fulton Cty. Sup. Ct. 2013), http://perma.cc/6N6Y-885Y
(emphasis added).  
118. Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. ex rel. Hercules & Leo v. Stanley, 16 
N.Y.S.3d 898, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015) (denial of petition for writ of habeas corpus). 
The Nonhuman Rights Project has filed a Notice of Appeal. See Notice of Appeal 
Filed in Hercules and Leo Case, NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT (Aug. 20, 2015),
http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/2015/08/20/notice-of-appeal-filed-in-
hercules-and-leo-case/. 
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noninterference with bodily integrity and legal personhood sufficient 
to protect that right seem basic and important in a rights-centered 
society. As philosopher Mary Midgley has written:  
It is . . . hard to adopt effectively the compromise which some 
philosophers now favour, of saying that it is indeed wrong to treat animals 
in certain ways, but that we have no duties to them or that they have no 
rights. ‘Animal rights’ may be hard to formulate, as indeed are the rights 
of humans. But ‘no rights’ will not do. . . . Where the realm of right and 
duty stops, there, to ordinary thinking, begins the realm of the optional.119
As important as it may be ultimately, the legal road to such 
recognition is likely to be long and focused only on specific animals 
with capacities similar to humans’ capacities. Both of these lawsuits 
on behalf of nonhuman animals are premised on the idea that orcas 
and chimpanzees are so similar to humans that justice requires their 
liberty from human tyranny and enslavement. Scientists have 
confirmed that chimpanzees and orcas have cognitive capacities 
similar to humans and that these animals can suffer in many of the 
same ways as humans.120 Yet, with each new addition of information 
about human-like capacities of animals, humans have simply 
redrawn the line between animals and humans such that animals 
remain firmly on one side and humans on the other.121 The scientific 
ground shifts every time there is some reason to accept some type of 
nonhuman animal as a moral or legal rights-holder. This shifting 
should not be surprising because status change, especially to a rights-
holding status, would undoubtedly make use of animals more 
difficult.  
Suppose that courts in today’s cultural climate were to accept 
that orcas and chimpanzees are so like humans that they are legal 
persons. The central question is: would that declaration change 
things for them, for other animals, or for society? Perhaps the easiest 
                                                     
119. Mary Midgley, Duties Concerning Islands, in ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS
89, 94 (Robert Elliot ed., 1995) (footnote omitted). 
120. E.g., Lori Marino, Brain Structure and Intelligence in Cetaceans, in 
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121. I have written extensively about this elsewhere. Taimie L. Bryant, 
Similarity or Difference as a Basis for Justice: Must Animals Be Like Humans to Be 
Legally Protected from Humans?, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 207 (2007). 
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of those questions to answer concerns other animals. If the basis for 
the lawsuits is similarity of particular animals to humans, then mere 
recognition of orcas’ and whales’ similarity to humans would say 
nothing about the similarity to humans of other nonhuman animals. 
The capacities by which we measure similarity validate human types 
of cognition, suffering, and responses to suffering. Even if we could 
painstakingly gain legal personhood status for some animals 
documented as sufficiently like humans, we would rapidly run out of 
qualified animals because our standards for admission are so 
limiting. With this model of entrance to a community of human (or 
human-like) legal persons, there is little room for diversity or 
difference no matter how much we may marvel at the unique 
capacities of animals that enable them to do things humans cannot 
do. The exclusive measure of animals is standards derived from 
human capacities. That we would allow some animals entry based on 
similarity to humans only reinforces a hierarchy of human qualities 
through which humans initially received moral and legal privilege to 
harm other animals. If anything, it gives new rights-holders the 
similar ability to harm other animals not included in the circle of 
rights-holders.122 So nothing would change for other animals except, 
perhaps, the addition of a new class of oppressors.123
There is no reason to believe that things would change 
dramatically even for the particular animals involved in the lawsuits: 
chimpanzees and orcas. After all is said and done, what exactly 
would it mean to treat them the same as humans? At its heart, there 
are two fundamental questions about the consequences for animals of 
gaining legal personhood. One is: would chimpanzees and orcas be 
granted autonomy in the way that humans understand “autonomy” 
for themselves? The other is: what do we do about competition for 
resources among those in the circle of rights-holders? If chimpanzees 
and humans both want the same habitat, would humans ever yield to 
chimpanzees? If orcas and humans both want the same fish, would 
                                                     
122. Id. at 218. 
123. “If . . . sea lions were found to be sufficiently similar to humans that 
justice required their receiving entitlements, their representatives surely would try to 
safeguard the health of sea lions by securing for them all the fish they need, which 
would most likely mean increasing the production of fish by intensive fish-farming. 
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humans ever yield to orcas? Already we see competition between 
marine mammals’ and humans’ uses of the oceans.124 Would 
recognition of chimpanzees and orcas mean that humans would have
to yield, at least some of the time? If that is what it means to be 
recognized as legal persons, such recognition may be a very long 
time in coming. That these are both stumbling blocks is indicated by 
questions about what is to happen to the orcas (should they be kept in 
sea pens or released or kept in some other type of housing?)125 and 
the chimpanzees (would confining them in a chimpanzee sanctuary 
nicer than their current cages be the limit of our obligation?).126
These are concerns about the extent to which humans must 
accommodate nonhuman animals if those animals’ status is changed. 
Despite these conceptual and pragmatic hurdles, it is likely that 
eventually animals will have to receive some kind of rights 
recognition because only laws based on rights and rights-holders 
confer adequate protection in the American context as it now 
exists.127 Yet, even if that is true, there are still choices among 
pathways to that goal. For instance, elsewhere I have suggested that 
legally limiting owner prerogative to end the lives of healthy 
companion animals would be a simple legal step in the direction of 
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meaning of rights and the privileges of hierarchy there could be a shift such that, 
coupled with societal shifts in conceptions of animals, could produce alternative 
legal constructs. Such is beyond the scope of this Article except to say that it is 
possible to pursue legal advocacy for animals that is not premised on entrance to the 
hierarchy of worthiness represented by humans. This Article provides one example 
of that type of advocacy: legal advocacy to protect those who are creating the 
opportunity within society to break free of the idea of animals as resources. 
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generating and signaling change in the meaning of “ownership” of 
animals.128 In this Article, I suggest that legal advocacy to protect the 
interests of producers of vegan products can shift cultural norms and 
eventually the legal rules about animals, including recognition of 
their personhood. No matter the rationale for the change in 
consumption behavior, respect for animals or health or social 
conformity to a new “trendy” way of eating, not consuming animals 
loosens the hold of the idea that we need to consume animals and the 
related idea that our need to consume them justifies however we treat 
them. At its heart, this is an argument about legal rules evolving in 
the context of culturally supported individual behavioral shifts 
(choice of consumption goods) rather than legal rules evolving based 
on scientific developments (chimpanzees and orcas documented as 
having capacities similar to humans).  
CONCLUSION
The idea of this Article emerged from conversations I had with 
animal lawyers regarding representation of The Cultured Kitchen. It 
was striking to me that the legal department of one of the animal 
protection organizations responsible for fighting the United Egg 
Producers’ fraudulent “Humane Care Certified” label129 and quite 
knowledgeable generally about labeling law would be unwilling to 
fight for a label that changes the definition of “cheese” from “a
human food product made from the mammary glands of female non-
human mammals” to “a food product consumed as a protein source 
or complement to beverages or other foods.” Providing legal 
assistance to cruelty-free producers interested in forging new 
definitions of formerly animal-based foods seems at least as 
beneficial to animals as litigating for a change in egg carton labels 
from “Humane Care Certified” to “Certified Humane Raised and 
Handled.”130 Which does more for consumers interested in protecting 
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animals? Which is likelier to decrease consumption of animal 
products?  
To me, the answer to those questions is obvious: Using legal 
skills to replace cruelly produced products with plant-based products 
is more beneficial in every way than is using legal skills to craft a 
compromise on the labeling of cruelly produced products. I write this 
even while holding some uneasiness about promoting more 
technology as the solution to problems born of technological 
developments of the past. It seems to me that Americans’ faith in the 
power of business to advance social goals is even stronger than 
American agribusiness’s present power to control and define what 
constitutes “food” and how it is produced. The legal and political 
decks are so heavily stacked in favor of producers of animal-derived 
products, fighting them head-on is unlikely to prove successful to 
any meaningful extent. As Buckminster Fuller is reputed to have 
emphasized, “You never change things by fighting the existing
reality. To change something, build a new model that makes the 
existing model obsolete.”131
In a society that values business and business-driven solutions, 
businesses that promise reduction in animal use are the “new model” 
that will assist us in redefining our relationship with animals. Instead 
of a relationship based on the old model of human consumption of 
animals and products derived from them—a model heavily laden 
with human-inflicted suffering justified by dismissing the experience 
of animals forced to endure that suffering—a new relationship can be 
forged based on the unique and wonderful characteristics of animals 
as individuals and as communities. What is being changed by the 
“new model” is the very basis upon which humans define animals 
and view animals and their habitats as worthy of protection. 
                                                                                                               
organization dedicated to improving the lives of farm animals in food production
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